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Abstract
This paper provides evidence that the Allied bombing of Vietnam, the longest and heaviest
aerial bombardment in the history, imposed detrimental effects on educational attainment of
school-age individuals. By exploiting the plausibly exogenous district-by-cohort variation
in bomb destruction under a difference-in-differences framework, we find that an increase
in bomb intensity leads to significantly fewer educational years completed by school-age
children exposed to the bombardment. A series of robustness checks, falsification tests, and
the instrumental-variable strategy further support our results. The findings underline the
importance of policies targeting children after wartime.
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1 Introduction
The dread of war and its disruptive consequences, ranging from the destruction of capital
and infrastructure to health and environment disasters, are widely known. From a macro
perspective, armed conflicts can hinder long-term economic development by inducing poverty
traps (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Sachs, 2008) or discouraging capital accumulation
(Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007). From a micro viewpoint, wars could potentially lead to
severe disruptions to people’s lives such as worsened health conditions, shortened schooling
accumulation and distorted labor market outcomes (Bundervoet et al., 2009; Akbulut-Yuksel,
2014). Other dreadful consequences of armed conflicts include diverting resources from
production, direct destruction of infrastructure, and increased mortality rates (Collier, 2009).
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the impacts of aerial bombardment, a
prevalent practice in modern warfare, on educational attainment and labor market outcomes of
children. To draw causal inferences, we restrict our study to the context of the Allied bombing
of Vietnam. We are particularly interested in the bombing of Vietnam for two reasons. First,
this is by far the longest and heaviest aerial bombardment in history. Throughout the
Vietnam War, more than 7.5 million tons of explosives were dropped by the U.S. and its
allies. The total weight of bomb delivered was three times as much as that dropped during
the European and Pacific Theater in World War II. Second, unlike other countries that were
studied previously (e.g. Germany and Austria in the works of Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004)
and Akbulut-Yuksel (2014)), Vietnam was much poorer at the time of the bombardment
period. Consequently, school-aged children during the bombing period were more likely to be
affected by shocks arising from such large-scale destruction. Given the substantial horrors of
war worldwide nowadays, understanding the long-run impacts of the Vietnam tragedy on
children’s educational accumulation is of considerable importance to devise policies to reverse
the negative effects.
To examine the impacts of wartime bombardment on educational accumulation, we em-
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ploy the difference-in-differences approach by exploiting the district-by-cohort variation in
bombing devastation. This identification strategy rests on the assumption which is had the
bombardment not occurred, the difference in schooling between the affected and unaffected
cohorts would have been the same. The parallel assumption ensuring internal validity of
the difference-in-differences model could potentially be violated due to the heterogeneity in
the reconstruction efforts after the war.1 To this end, we propose a novel instrument, the
“frequency of aerial reconnaissance”. The availability of military intelligence, as measured
by the frequency of aerial reconnaissance, can strongly predict the actual bomb delivered
onto a given district. Intuitively, the higher the scouting frequency over an area, the higher
the chance of ‘suspicious activities’ and ‘potential threats’ being captured. Consequently,
districts that are scouted more often tend to be bombed more heavily. More importantly,
aerial reconnaissance on its own does not leave any physical destruction or disruption, thus,
affecting schooling accumulation of children through the only channel of actual bombing.
An additional contribution of this paper is the precise measure of aerial bombardment
drawn from the Theater History of Operation. Unlike previous studies which either have
limited or no information on the intensity of armed conflicts (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer,
2004; Bundervoet et al., 2009), or rely on unadjusted measures of destruction such as the
quantity of bombs (Miguel and Roland, 2011), our measure of bombing devastation is the
bomb density - defined as the total weight of all weapons (in tons) dropped onto a district,
divided by its area (in square kilometer).2 ,3 The incorporation of weapon weight, which
adjusts for the destructive power of different classes of weapons, can provide a more accurate
measure for the bombardment havoc.
1 It is possible that the Vietnamese government allocated resources unevenly across districts with different
growth prospects in the postwar reconstruction period.
2 Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) uses “being born in Austria and Germany” and “being born between
1930-1939” as an exposure to the World War II. Bundervoet et al. (2009) relies on the timing and location
of the civil war.
3 Weapons include different classes of bombs, missiles, rockets, and ammunition. See Section 2.1 for details.
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This paper can be related to the literature of investigating the impacts of wars/armed conflicts
on human capital. For example, Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) along with Akbulut-Yuksel
(2014) analyze the educational and earnings loss in Austria and Germany due to World
War II. Shemyakina (2011), Chamarbagwala and Moran (2011), and Leon (2012) detect
substantial negative effects of civil war on human capital accumulation in central Asia and
South America. Shemyakina (2011) points out the gender differential effects of armed conflict
with more adverse consequences falling on adolescent girls.
Our study reaches the following findings. First, a 10% increase in bomb density causes
school-age individuals who were exposed to the aerial barrage for at least five years to
complete from 0.01 to 0.02 fewer years of education. To put these numbers to perspective,
the gap in educational attainment between an individual in an average bombed district and
an individual in the most heavily bombed district was about 0.3 to 0.7 years. Second, we
explore the nonlinearity effects of aerial bombardment. Third, differential impacts of bomb
destruction across gender are detected with larger repercussions on females. Finally, we
document a negative relationship between aerial bombardment and individual earnings.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data and our analysis sample.
Section 3 presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 provides the estimation results,
falsification test, and robustness check. Section 5 concludes our paper.
2 Data and Analysis Sample
2.1 Data Overview
The data for this study is drawn from two sources: the Theater History of Operations
(THOR) and the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2010-2014 (VHLSS). We first
use the THOR database released by the U.S. Department of Defense in late 2016 to measure
bombing intensity at the district level.4 The raw data were recorded at the flight-mission level
4 The THOR dataset can be accessed at the website of the Air Force Research Institute (www.au.af.mil).
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that was drawn from the Combat Activities File 1965-1970 (CACTA), the Southeast Asia
Aerial Bombing Database 1970-1975 (SEADAB), and the Strategic Air Command’s Combat
Activities 1965-1973 (SACCOACT). The publicly available information includes a description
of each mission (e.g. mission code, date, operation supported, source of mission logs), a
description of aircrafts carrying out the mission (e.g. Air Force Groups, type and quantity of
aircrafts, takeoff location, fly hours, time on target), a description of weapons delivered (e.g.
ordnance type, quantity, weight, purpose category, and time off target), and a description of
mission targets (e.g. latitude-longitude coordinates of targets, target description, weather
condition, and bomb damage assessment).
In the THOR database, there are approximately 4.84 million flight missions carried out by
104 types of aircraft during the period of 1965 - 1975. The mainly used type of aircraft is
the fighter-bomber McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, carrying out approximately 957,427
missions. There are 239 main classes of weapons delivered during the Vietnam War including
173 classes of bombs, 25 classes of missiles, 28 classes of rockets, and 13 classes of ammunition.
To capture the district-level intensity of bombs delivered from 1965 to 1975, we construct the
bomb density measure (in tons per square-kilometer, t/km2), by dividing the total weight of
all weapons (in tons) dropped within a district boundary by its area (in km2).
By special permission, we obtain access to three waves (2010, 2012, and 2014) of the VHLSS
from the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam, which provides the information for
individuals in our analysis.5 The VHLSS is an ongoing longitudinal survey of the Vietnamese
population that has been conducted since 1992 by the GSO. The VHLSS allows us to identify
the province and district of residence of each individual as well as a wide range of demographic
information such as birth year, years of education, gender, marital status, parental education
background, among others.
5 The VHLSS can be obtained from the official website of GSO (www.gso.gov.vn).
4
2.2 Analysis Sample
To examine the impacts of the immense devastation on educational accumulation, we rely
on the difference-in-differences strategy, which requires one affected (treated) group and one
unaffected (control) group.6 In our main setup, we choose the cohorts of 1953 - 1963 as
the affected group and the cohorts of 1985 - 1996 as the unaffected group. Specifically, war
(affected) cohorts are defined as individuals who spent at least five years of schooling during
the bombing period of 1965 - 1975. We believe that the five years of exposure is long enough
for the effects of bombing to be realized. We then proceed to drop cohorts of 1948 - 1952
and 1964 - 1969 because they were exposed to the aerial bombardment for fewer than five
school years. We do, however, include these individuals in the affected (war) cohorts in a
robustness check. Categorizing them into the war cohorts does not substantially change our
result. Table A1 in the Appendix provides the number of school years exposed to aerial
bombardment. We also remove individuals born between 1970 and 1984 since this group
attended school during the Reconstruction period and might partially suffer from adverse
effects of the large-scale bombing destruction.
On the other hand, individuals born during 1985 - 1996 constitute the unaffected (non-war)
cohorts since they attained their education after the “Doi Moi” marking an end to the
postwar reconstruction period. We further restrict our sample to those at least 18 years old,
i.e. those supposed to already finish high school, when being surveyed. Moreover, macro-level
studies suggest that economies quickly return to their steady state within 20 years after wars,
(see, for example, Davis and Weinstein, 2002, Brakman et al., 2004, and Miguel and Roland,
2011), lending additional support to our choice of the 1985 - 1996 cohorts as an unaffected
group. Although the main analysis sample includes the war cohorts of 1953 - 1963 and the
unaffected non-war cohorts of 1985 - 1996, we also try different categorizations of the two
groups in various robustness checks as well as the inclusion of all individuals (born between
6 Details of this method are provided in Section 3.1.
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1909 - 1996) in the generalized specification.
Summary statistics for individual-level and district-level variables are respectively presented
in Panel A and B of Table A2. An issue with the VHLSS is that they only provide the
number of school grades completed. In other words, the number of years of education is
top-coded at 12. Therefore, in our main specification, we use this raw top-coded measure of
education as our primary outcome. We also attempt to deal with this issue by imputing the
total number of educational years based on the reported grade completed and educational
level in a different specification. Particularly, individuals with college, university, master,
and PhD degrees are assigned with 14, 16, 18, and 20 educational years respectively. The
conceptual framework of how aerial bombardment could impact schooling accumulation is
presented in Appendix B. As shown in Panel A of Table A2, the war cohorts completed 7.5
years of education on average while the non-war cohorts finished 9.75 years of education. We
also empirically investigate the effects of bombing devastation on labor market outcomes,
using personal annual earnings. The mean annual earnings of the war cohorts is roughly 35
million VND (around 1,500 USD) whereas that of the non-war cohorts is 29 million VND
(1,300 USD).7 Turing to district-level variables, as visible from Panel B, the average bomb
dropped onto a district is 11.42 tons per km2 and the maximum bomb density is 279.38 tons
per km2. The average frequency of aerial reconnaissance in a district is 185.71 times, with
the maximum of 7,578 times (further discussion is provided in Section 3.2). In total, we have
information on approximately 32,000 individuals across 625 districts of 63 provinces.
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Difference-in-Differences Approach
To evaluate the effects of aerial bombardment on schooling accumulation and labor market
outcomes, we rely on the exogenous district-by-cohort variation in bomb destruction intensity,
7 It is worth noting that all monetary values in the paper are in 2010 constant price.
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and employ a difference-in-differences framework given in the following equation:
Yidt = β0 + β1WarCohortic ×BombIntensityd +X ′idcγ + δd + λt + idc (1)
where Yidt is the outcomes of interest for individual i residing in district d and born in year t,
including the number of educational years and the log of annual earnings. The WarCohortc
term is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if an individual was exposed to the Allied
bombing for at least five schooling years (born between 1953 and 1963), and zero otherwise.8 ,9
The BombIntensityd term is the log of bomb density measure where bomb density is defined
as the total weight of all weapons (in tons) dropped onto district d divided by the district
area (in square kilometers).
The vector X ′idc includes: (i) individuals’ observable characteristics (e.g. gender, mother
education, indicator for living in the north) and survey year fixed effects, (ii) a set of
interactions between the observables and birth year dummies to account for differential return
of these demographic characteristics by cohorts (Acemoglu et al., 2004), and (iii) another set
of interactions between district-level geographic controls and birth year indicators to account
for the factors determining local economic conditions and strategic bombing decisions during
wartime. Geographic variables proxying for local development include districts’ centroid
longitude, latitude, distance to coast, average precipitation, temperature, terrain ruggedness,
and land suitability. Other geographic factors potentially affecting military strategy during
the Vietnam War are also controlled for, such as district average altitude and district centroid
distance to Ho Chi Minh Trail (Miguel and Roland, 2011).10
The next two terms, δd and λt, denote district and birth year fixed effects, respectively
8 Ideally, we should use the individual’s district of birth instead of the district of residence. However, the
VHLSS does not provide this information. We address the potential issue of migration in Section 4.2.
9 As a robustness check, we also consider those ever exposed to the bombardment during their schooling
time as the war cohort.
10 For example, Ho Chi Minh trail was the main route through which the Communists supplied their backed
insurgents fighting in the South, therefore, was bombed heavily.
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and idc is the error term. We also control for the province-specific time trend, and cluster
standard errors at the district-by-birth-year level. Coefficient β1 captures the effects of aerial
bombardment on educational attainment and labor market outcomes of the war cohorts.
In this setup, we exploit the exogenous district-by-cohort variation in the devastation of
aerial bombing where treatment is the interaction between War Cohort dummy and the
natural log of bomb density in a given district. For β1 to have a causal interpretation, the
fundamental identifying assumption, which is, had the aerial bombardment not occurred, the
difference in schooling and earnings between the unaffected and affected (war) cohorts would
have been the same across districts with varying bomb intensity levels, must be satisfied. To
assess this assumption, we specify the generalized version of equation (1) by estimating the
cohort-specific impacts of aerial bombardment:
Yidt = β0 +
11∑
g=1
(Cohortig ×BombIntensityd)β1g +X ′idcγ + δd + λt + idc (2)
where Yidt is the outcome for individual i residing in district d and born in year t. Cohortig
is an indicator taking the value of 1 if an individual i was born in cohort g. Birth cohorts
are grouped into 11 years of birth categories, and the cohorts 1985 - 1996 constitute the
comparison group and are omitted from the regression. Each coefficient β1g represents the
effects of bombing destruction on a given cohort group. If the “parallel trend” is satisfied
then the impact of aerial bombardment should be indistinguishable from zero for cohorts that
completed their education before the start of the bombardment period (cohorts born prior to
1948), or for any cohorts who did not spend their schooling years during the devastation time.
3.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
An additional problem that may compromise the integrity of the difference-in-differences
estimates is that the Vietnamese government might have put more efforts in reconstructing
districts with better growth prospects. This possibility can violate the parallel trend as-
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sumption, thus, invalidating our difference-in-differences estimates. To address this concern,
we employ the instrumental variable approach where the instrument for the log of bomb
density is the availability of military intelligence. According to Chapter 4 of the US Army
FM 7-92, reconnaissance is a mission aimed to collect information about the activities and
resources of the enemy or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Thus, we use the
frequency of the aerial reconnaissance to measure the availability of military intelligence. This
instrumental variable is constructed by taking log of the total number of aerial reconnaissance
over a district during the period of 1965 - 1975. Data for aerial reconnaissance is also taken
from THOR database.
Intuitively, the frequency of the aerial reconnaissance over a particular area strongly predicts
the actual amount of bomb dropped onto that area because of the following lines of reasoning.
First, the aerial reconnaissance is sent out to collect imagery intelligence, signals intelligence,
etc. The higher the scouting frequency over an area, the higher the chance of ‘suspicious
activities’ and ‘potential threats’ being captured. Consequently, districts that are scouted
more often tend to be bombed more heavily. For example, the reconnaissance mission was
carried out for less than twice in the district of Na Hang (Tuyen Quang Province) and Xi
Man (Ha Giang Province), and the total weight of bomb dropped onto these districts was far
less than 1 ton per km2. On the contrary, in the district of Tan Chau (Tay Ninh Province)
and Gio Linh (Quang Tri Province), the frequency of reconnaissance was 1397 and 1798
times respectively, and the bomb density in these districts was 114.67 and 1798 ton per km2.
The relationship can also be expressed graphically. Figure 1 provides the association between
the log of bomb density and the log of the frequency of aerial reconnaissance. The exclusion
restriction condition for the validity of the instrument “frequency of the aerial reconnaissance”
is also satisfied in a sense that it is orthogonal on reconstruction efforts. The availability
of military reconnaissance can only affect educational attainment and earnings of the war
cohorts only through the channel of actual bombing.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Aerial Reconnaissance and Bomb Intensity, both in log forms
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Difference-in-Differences Results
We report our baseline results on educational attainment from equation (1) in Table 1. Each
cell is the difference-in-differences estimate from a regression that controls for district and
birth year fixed effects, survey year fixed effects, and several sets of interactions as discussed
in Section 3.1. Column 1 shows the estimated effect for the full sample which is negative
(-0.101) and statistically significant at 1%. This implies a 10% increase in bomb density leads
to a reduction of 0.01 years of education for individuals who spent at least five years of their
schooling during the bombardment time.11 To get a better understanding of the magnitude
of the impact, we compare the educational attainment of an individual in a heavily bombed
district, say, Gio Linh (Quang Tri Province) where the bomb density was 279.38 ton/km2 (the
maximal bomb density, Table A2), and an individual in a district with average bomb density
(11.42 ton/km2, Table A2). Individuals of school age during the bombing period in Gio Linh
11 Because BombIntensity is the log of bomb density, the linear-log specification (1) where the outcome is
the number of educational years omits the six districts which were not bombed at all. To this respect,
we re-estimate equation (1) where BombIntensity is log(1 + bombdensity). The point estimate is still
negative and significant, implying the gap of 0.5 years of education between affected individuals in the most
heavily bombed district and affected individuals in the district with average destruction level (Column 1 of
Table A3).
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completed 0.3 years of education than those in a district with average destruction level. This
impact is consonant with the effect of wars or civil conflicts on educational attainment in
Akbulut-Yuksel (2014), and Leon (2012).
Table 1: Impacts of Aerial Bombardment on Educational Attainment
Mother with Mother with
All Male Female higher than primary
Individuals Only Only primary education
education or less
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WarCohort × -0.101∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.045 -0.373∗∗∗
Bomb Intensity (0.031) (0.042) (0.041) (0.062) (0.126)
Sample size 32,440 15,662 16,778 3,233 2,540
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (1). War cohorts consist of individuals born in 1953-1963.
The comparison (unaffected) cohorts include individuals born in 1985-1996. Regressions are conditioned on
district, birth year, survey year fixed effects, and province-specific time trend. Individual observable
characteristics include gender, mother education, an indicator for living in the north, and the interactions of
these characteristics with birth year dummies. Additional controls consist of the interactions between
district-level geographic characteristics and birth year indicators. See Section 3.1 for the details on
geographic controls. Standard errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level and provided in the
parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1.
We present the heterogeneity of the impacts of aerial bombardment in Column 2 through 5
of Table 1 along the lines of gender and mother’s education. A female who spent at least
five school years during the bombardment finished 0.012 fewer years of schooling in response
to a 10% increase in bomb density (Column 3) while the reduction for a male counterpart
is roughly 0.008 year (Column 2). This finding is consistent with the work of Shemyakina
(2011) where a larger impact of armed conflicts on females is documented. As evident from
Column 4 and 5, individuals with higher educated mothers (mothers’ education is higher
than primary level) were hardly affected by bomb destruction while individuals with a more
disadvantaged background (mother with lower educational attainment, primary education
or less) were severely impacted. Having said that, due to a large number of missing values
for mother’s education, we urge some caution in interpreting the heterogeneous effects of
bombing in this respect.
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4.2 Mobility, Falsification, Nonlinearity, and Generalized Model
Endogenous Mobility - It should be noted that in equation (1) and (2) we measure the
bomb density at the district of residence, not the district of birth, level. Endogenous mobility
could potentially contaminate our coefficient estimates since people might have reallocated
from heavily bombed districts to less destroyed ones for better living conditions or the
heavily destroyed districts might have been better in attracting labor and talent during the
reconstruction era. We test for this potential contamination by creating a migration indicator
that takes the value of 1 if the individual lacks permanent registration in their district of
residence.12 Demombynes and Vu (2016) documented that very few people moved without
the sanction before 1990, and those who did move struggled to survive without local “ho khau”
(permanent registration). Using Household Registration data of Vietnam, Demombynes and
Vu (2016) further shows that the population without permanent registration has demographics
characteristics that are typical of migrant populations. Therefore, the probability of not
holding “ho khau” is a good proxy for the probability of migration. We estimate equation (1)
using the migration indicator as the outcome variable. Table 2 reports the point estimate.
Evident from Column 1, aerial barrage does not appear to be correlated with the probability
of migration.
Falsification Test - To lend support to the causal interpretation of the estimated effect of
bomb destruction on educational accumulation in Table 1, we conduct a falsification test.
Particularly, we run equation (1) with the war cohorts being those born between 1909 and
1940 (who should have completed their education before the bombardment started). The
1985 - 1996 cohorts still serve as a comparison unaffected group. If the effects of aerial
bombardment on education are true, we expect to find no impact of bomb destruction
on individuals who finished schooling prior to the onset of the bombing of Vietnam. We
12 This permanent registration system known as “ho khau”, which is similar to the “hukou” in China, “hoju”
in Korea and “koseki” in Japan. The “ho khau” is a remnant of the centrally planned economy that was
employed by the States for public security and control of migration. Those moving from one district to
another must meet certain requirements in order to transfer their “ho khau”.
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report the results to this exercise in Column 2 of Table 2. The point estimate is small and
highly insignificant (p-value is 0.681), suggesting no spurious relationship between bombing
destruction and schooling accumulation.
Table 2: Tests for Endogenous Mobility, Falsification, and Nonlinear Effects
Years of Years of
Migration Education Education
(1) (2) (3)
WarCohort × -0.002 -0.018 WarCohort × Middle Third -0.057
Bomb Intensity (0.001) (0.044) Bomb Intensity (0.125)
WarCohort × Top Third -0.350∗∗
Bomb Intensity (0.141)
Sample size 32,440 23,452 33,702
NOTE: Column 1 reports the coefficient β1 in equation (1) but the outcome is the migration indicator
(defined as individual lacking permanent registration in their district of residence). In Column 1, the war
cohorts consist of individuals born in 1953-1963 and the comparison (i.e. unaffected) cohorts include
individuals born in 1985-1996. Column 2 presents the results of a falsification test (using specification (1))
where the “war” cohorts include individuals born prior to 1940 and the unaffected cohorts contain individuals
born between 1985 and 1996. Column 3 shows the possible nonlinear impacts of bomb destruction where the
single BombIntensity measure is replaced with indicators which take the value of 1 if the bomb density in
the district lies in the top, middle, and bottom third of the bomb density distribution (with the bottom third
dummy being omitted). Standard errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level and provided in the
parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on control variables.
Nonlinear Effects - To explore the possible nonlinear effects of aerial bombardment, we
replace the single BombIntensityd measure in equation (1) with three indicators , each of
which takes the value of 1 if the bomb density in the district lies in the top, middle, and
bottom third of the bomb density distribution (with the bottom third dummy being omitted).
The results are reported in Column 3 of Table 2. The adverse effects are both economically
and statistically significant for individuals in districts in the top third of the bomb destruction
distribution; however, the point estimate falls short of statistical significance for individuals
in districts in the middle third of the bomb distribution.13
Generalized Difference-in-Differences - The validity of the results in Table 1 depends
13 Sample size is larger than that in Column 1 of Table 1 because here we take into account six districts with
zero bomb destruction. These districts belong to the omitted bottom third category.
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on the identifying assumption that the difference in years of education between the war and
non-war cohorts would have remained the same across districts with varying bomb intensity
levels if the bombing devastation had never happened. We provide the estimates for the
cohort-specific effects of aerial barrage on educational accumulation using equation (2). For
the parallel trend assumption to hold, there should be no effect for any cohorts that were not
exposed to the bombardment during their school-going years. That is what we find based on
the estimating results reported in Table 3.14
Table 3: Aerial Bombardment and Individual Outcomes by Cohorts
Years of Education Log(Earnings)
Coefficients Std. Errors Coefficients Std. Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Born before 1936×Bomb Intensity 0.003 (0.048) -0.061 (0.042)
Born(1937-1941)×Bomb Intensity -0.029 (0.061) -0.046 (0.050)
Born(1942-1947)×Bomb Intensity -0.012 (0.054) -0.049 (0.048)
Born(1948-1952)×Bomb Intensity -0.081∗ (0.048) -0.012 (0.054)
Born(1953-1957)×Bomb Intensity -0.142∗∗∗ (0.040) -0.030 (0.051)
Born(1958-1960)×Bomb Intensity -0.089∗∗ (0.043) -0.165∗∗∗ (0.063)
Born(1961-1964)×Bomb Intensity -0.107∗∗∗ (0.036) -0.068 (0.057)
Born(1965-1968)×Bomb Intensity -0.023 (0.038) 0.015 (0.056)
Born(1969-1974)×Bomb Intensity 0.037 (0.033) 0.062 (0.049)
Born(1975-1984)×Bomb Intensity 0.011 (0.027) -0.003 (0.040)
Sample size 80,692 80,692
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1g in equation (2). Omitted cohorts are individuals born during
1985-1996. Standard errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level and provided in the parentheses.
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on control variables.
For cohorts of 1948 - 1952, 1953 - 1957, 1958 - 1960, and 1961 - 1964 the estimated effects
are negative and significant while for other cohorts (who finished schooling prior to the
bombardment period, e.g. the 1937 - 1941 cohort, or attained education after the end of
the bombing destruction, e.g. the 1975 - 1984 cohort), point estimates are statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Individuals born in 1953 - 1957 and 1961 - 1964 respectively
14 In the generalized difference-in-differences framework, we include all cohorts and group them into different
categories. There are 11 groups and cohorts 1985 - 1996 are omitted from the regression.
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completed 0.014 and 0.011 fewer years of education in response to a 10% increase in bomb
density. In other words, individuals born in 1953 - 1957 in a district with maximal aerial
destruction completed 0.45 fewer educational years than those in a district with average
destruction level. The reduction in years of education for cohorts 1948 - 1952 and 1958 - 1960
is around 0.008 to 0.009 when bomb density rises by 10%.15 Figure 2 plots these coefficients
and the 90% confidence interval.
Figure 2: Impacts of Aerial Bombardment on Years of Education by Cohorts, 90% CI.
Robustness Checks - As a robustness check, we examine the impacts of aerial bombardment
on the number of educational years using equation (1) with different definitions of war and
non-war cohorts. Results are reported in Table 4. In Column 1 and 2, the 1909 - 1935 and
the 1935 - 1947 cohorts (who completed schooling prior to the onset of the Allied bombing)
are respectively defined as the comparison group, with the war cohorts being the 1953 - 1963
groups. Point estimates are negative, significant, and close in magnitude to the estimate in
Table 1, implying a reduction in schooling for individuals of school age in the bombarded
districts during the devastation period.
In Column 3, all cohorts other than the main war cohorts (1953 - 1963) constitute the
unaffected group. In Column 4, the affected cohorts consist of those born between 1948 and
15 Cohorts of 1948 - 1952 were exposed to the bombardment from 0.5 to 4 school years.
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1968, who ever spent any time of their schooling years in the bombardment period. The
effects are still negative and significant, although the point estimate is smaller than the one
in Table 1. Individuals exposed to the aerial bombardment for at least eight school years are
considered the war cohorts in Column 5. The estimated impact is somewhat similar to the
effect in the main specification.16 ,17
Table 4: Aerial Bombardment and Education: Different Unaffected and War Cohorts
Y = Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WarCohort× -0.139∗∗ -0.116∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗
Bomb Intensity (0.056) (0.047) (0.024) (0.026) (0.040)
Sample size 18,784 21,431 80,692 44,924 24,477
War Cohorts 1953-1963 1953-1963 1953-1963 1948-1968 1956-1960
Non-war Cohorts 1909-1935 1935-1947 Others 1985-1996 1985-1996
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (1) with different definitions of war and non-war cohorts.
Standard errors are clustered at district-by-birth year level and provided in the parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.01,
∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on control variables.
4.3 Instrumental Variable Results
Another important concern for the parallel trend assumption is the possible endogeneity of
the distribution of postwar reconstruction. Put it differently, the reconstruction efforts might
have been unevenly allocated across districts with different growth prospects. To address
this concern, we employ an instrumental variable method. The bomb density is instrumented
by (the log of) the frequency of aerial reconnaissance.
We report the 2SLS estimate for equation (1) in Table 5. The second-stage estimate (Column
16 We also try employing a different measure of bomb density. Instead of using the total weight of all bombs
dropped onto a given district as in the main text, we consider only bombs which were intended to destroy
physical capital. The result, which remains close to the main estimate in Table 1, is reported in Column 2
of Table A3.
17 In a different specification, we impute the total number of educational years based on the reported grade
completed and educational level, and re-estimate our main specification (1) using the imputed total years
of education as the dependent variable. Particularly, individuals with college, university, master, and PhD
degrees are assigned with 14, 16, 18, and 20 educational years respectively. Results to this exercise are
similar to the main results and are provided in Column 3 of Table A3.
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1) is -0.237 and significant at 1%. A 10% increase in bombing devastation results in a
reduction of 0.02 years of education for the war cohorts, implying school-aged individuals in
a district with maximal bombing havoc completed 0.76 fewer years of education than those
in a district with average damage level. In Column 2, we report the first-stage estimate
and statistics. The first-stage estimate is close to unity and highly significant, consistent
with the hypothesis that the more likely to be bombed districts are also the ones being
scouted more frequently. The statistics in Table 5 indicate the instrument “frequency of
aerial reconnaissance” passes the weak instrument and weak-instrument-robust inference
tests.18 Reduced-form estimate, which is negative and significant, is provided in Column 3.
Table 5: Aerial Bombardment and Education: Instrumental Variable Approach
Second Stage First Stage Reduced Form
Years of Warcohort × Years of
Education Bomb Intensity Education
(1) (2) (3)
War Cohort×Bomb Intensity -0.237∗∗∗
(0.059)
Warcohort × Frequency of 0.808∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
Aerial Reconnaissance (0.019) (0.047)
Sample size 31,308 31,308
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 1812.32
Anderson-Rubin Wald test (Chi-square) 17.10
Stock-Wright LM S statistic 19.07
NOTE: This table reports the second, the first stage, and the reduced form coefficients in a 2SLS estimation
of equation (1). Bomb Intensity is instrumented by the logarithm of the frequency of aerial reconnaissance.
Standard errors are clustered at district-by-birth year level and provided in the parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.01,
∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on control variables.
18 The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is 1812.32, exceeding the Stock-Yogo critical value for one
endogenous variable and instrument at 10% maximal IV size (16.38). The Chi-square statistics for
Anderson-Rubin Wald test and the Chi-square statistics for the Stock-Wright LM S statistic are 17.10 and
19.07, respectively. Both numbers are larger than the Chi-square (1) critical value of 3.841 at the 5 percent
significance level.
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4.4 Results on Labor Market Outcomes
In this subsection, we explore the effects of aerial bombardment on future labor market
outcomes. The dependent variable is the log of annual earnings. The main difference-in-
differences estimate in Column 1 of Table 6 is negative and marginally significant (p-value is
0.124). Estimates using different categorizations of war and non-war cohorts are reported from
Column 2 through 6. There are negative and strongly significant impacts on annual earnings
when the comparison group is individuals other than the 1953 - 1963 cohorts. In other words,
1% increase in bomb density leads to 0.086% decrease in annual earnings for individuals
exposed to the aerial barrage for at least five school years. Put it differently, the annual
earnings of an individual in the most heavily bombed district is around three-fourths of the
yearly income of an individual in a district with average destruction level. The cohort-specific
impact on annual earnings in the generalized difference-in-differences framework is reported
in Column 2 of Table 3. The adverse effects of bombing devastation are only found for
individuals born in the period of 1958 - 1960. Figure 3 plots these coefficients and the 90%
confidence interval.
Table 6: Aerial Bombardment and Earnings: Different Unaffected and War Cohorts
Y = Log Individual Annual Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WarCohort× -0.073 0.004 -0.001 -0.086∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.042
Bomb Intensity (0.047) (0.048) (0.045) (0.033) (0.040) (0.060)
Sample size 32440 18784 21431 80692 44924 24477
War Cohorts 1953-1963 1953-1963 1953-1963 1953-1963 1948-1968 1956-1960
Non-war Cohorts 1985-1996 1909-1935 1935-1947 Others 1985-1996 1985-1996
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (1) with different categorizations of war and non-war
cohorts. Standard errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level and provided in the parentheses.
∗∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for details on control variables.
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Figure 3: Impacts of Aerial Bombardment on Annual Earnings by Cohorts, 90% CI.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by providing causal evidence on the ramifications of
large-scale physical destruction during the Allied bombing of Vietnam. Notably, we exploit
the district-by-cohort variation in bomb intensity in a difference-in-differences framework to
quantify the effects of interest. The paper also utilizes the newly released dataset (THOR)
to construct a more accurate measure of aerial destruction, the total weight of all weapons
dropped onto a district per km2 area. We further introduce a novel instrument for bomb
intensity: the frequency of aerial reconnaissance, which is not only strongly correlated
with actual bombing but also exogenous to educational trends. The negative impacts on
schooling accumulation detected in this paper highlights the long-term consequences of aerial
bombardment. Specifically, we find that a 10% increase in bomb density leads to a reduction
from 0.01 year of education (in a difference-in-differences specification) to 0.02 educational
years (in the instrumental variable specification) for individuals who spent at least five
schooling years during the bombing of Vietnam. To put these numbers into perspective, a
school-aged individual in the most destroyed district completed from 0.3 to 0.7 fewer years of
education than his/her peer in the district with an average bomb density level. Our results
are robust to different robustness checks, falsification test and the test for parallel trends.
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The detrimental consequences of aerial bombardment on schooling accumulation among
the war cohorts could potentially transmit through both the supply side and the demand
side of the education production function. Through the supply side, aerial bombardment
could destroy schools, and increase the absence of teachers (see, for example, Glewwe and
Jacoby, 1994; Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014). Through the demand side, adverse income shocks to
households (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Thomas et al., 2004), sizable damages to both mental
and physical health (Hoeﬄer and Reynal-Querol, 2003; Ghobarah et al., 2003; Annan et al.,
2006; Evans and Miguel, 2007) could possibly shrink the number of students. Unfortunately,
we are unable to formally analyze these potential mechanisms due to the unavailability of
historical data.
We also document adverse effects of aerial bombardment on future labor market outcomes.
Given that the returns to education go beyond personal earnings, the reduction in educational
attainment among the war cohorts could have affected other aspects of their lives such as
health (Silles, 2009; Conti et al., 2010; Kemptner et al., 2011), and the outcomes of their
offspring (Currie and Moretti, 2003; McCrary and Royer, 2011; Lundborg et al., 2014). Our
findings underline the importance of policies targeting children after wartime.
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Appendix A: Supplementary Tables
Table A1: Number of School Years Affected from Aerial Bombardment
Minimum Cohorts Minimum Cohorts Minimum Cohorts
Exposed Years Exposed Years Exposed years
1 1949-1967 4 1952-1964 7 1955-1961
2 1950-1966 5 1953-1963 8 1956-1960
3 1951-1965 6 1954-1962 9 1957-1959
Table A2: Summary Statistics
Affected Unaffected All Bombed Districts
Mean Mean Mean Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Individual Panel B: District
Years of Education 7.51 9.75 Bomb Density (t/km2) 11.42 279.38
(3.56) (3.09) (26.40)
Annual Earnings 35,614 29,210 Reconnaissance Frequency 185.71 7578
(41,173) (24,608) (540.03)
Year of Birth 1958 1989 Number of Provinces 63
(3.09) (2.95)
Sample size 15,113 17,327 Number of Districts 625
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Affected group refer to individuals born in the period of
1953-1963. Unaffected group includes those born in the period of 1985-1996. Monetary values of earnings are
in ’000 VND, 2010 constant price.
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Table A3: Aerial Bombardment and Education: Supplementary Specifications
Years of Years of Imputed Years
Education Education of Education
(1) (2) (3)
WarCohort × Log(1+Bomb Density) -0.163∗∗∗
(0.049)
WarCohort × Bomb Intensity -0.083∗∗∗
(with intention to destroy) (0.031)
WarCohort × Bomb Intensity -0.103∗∗∗
(0.035)
Sample size 33,702 32,112 32,440
NOTE: Each cell reports coefficient β1 of equation (1). War cohorts consist of individuals born in 1953 -
1963. The comparison (unaffected) cohorts include individuals born in 1985 - 1996. In Column 1,
BombIntensityd is defined as the log of (1+Bomb Density) to account for districts with no bombing
destruction. In Column 2, the measure of bomb density is restricted to bombs the mission of which was to
destroy physical capital. In Column 3, BombIntensityd is still the log of Bomb Density, but dependent
variable is the imputed years of education (individuals with college, university, master, and PhD degrees are
assigned with 14, 16, 18, and 20 educational years respectively). See the note under Table 1 for details on
control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the district-by-birth year level and provided in the
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix B: Conceptual Framework
While the aerial devastation can affect educational attainment of exposed children through
many channels, in this paper, we are interested in the overall effect. We assume that this total
effect distorts the efficiency in accumulating human capital, thus, discouraging educational
attainment. Based on the Schooling and Wage Earnings model in Cahuc et al. (2014), our
model is modified to focus entirely on the decision of school-age individuals.19
Now, suppose that individuals are expected to live for T > 0 years (excluding retiring and
pre-schooling years). At year τ ≤ T , individuals face two options: (1) leaving school to
join the labor market, or (2) staying in school to accumulate human capital. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that individuals cannot go back to school after joining the labor
market. Let us denote by s ≥ 0 the “additional years of schooling” expected to attain by an
individual at year τ . Her human capital after s additional years of schooling is given by,





19 Cahuc, P., Carcillo, S., and Zylberberg, A. (2014). Labor economics. MIT press.
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is the level of human capital at year τ , with τ years of schooling
and h0 innate human capital. The value of Θ(·) represents the local level of efficiency affecting
human capital production, and x is the degree of destruction caused by the aerial bombing.
We assume that ∂Θ(x)/∂x < 0, such that the efficiency level is negatively correlated with
bombing destruction. Thus, after s years of additional schooling, human capital increases by
an amount of ∆hτ = hτ+s − hτ , given by,




By staying in school to gain ∆hτ unit of human capital, she produces zero unit of output
for s years. However, if she chooses to quit school and go to work, her production function
exhibits constant returns to scale technology taking a form of:
yτ = hτ (5)
where yτ is the amount of output produced, and hτ is the level of human capital accumulated
up to year τ . Normalizing output price to one, zero-profit condition implies that individual
earning is also her human capital wτ = hτ . The discounted value of lifetime gain from s










where ρ is the discount factor. Thus, the marginal return of the additional years of schooling










The symbol , indicates that common terms are suppressed for simplicity. The first order
condition, i.e. setting ∂∆Ωτ/∂s = 0, yields the optimal years of schooling,
τ + s =










> τ , if x ≤ x˘
(8)








1− e−Tρ). The model generates two important predictions
regarding the relationship between bombing destruction x and individuals’ educational
attainment τ + s.
First, the probability of staying in school P (τ + s > τ) is directly linked to the degree of
destruction x according to the equality P (τ + s > τ) = P (x ≤ x˘). Therefore, the theory
suggests that across geographic units and individuals identical in all respects except for
the degree of bombing destruction, the higher the degree of destruction x, the lower the
probability of staying in school P (τ + s > τ). In other words, when the degree of bombing
destruction exceeds a certain threshold x˘, individuals will drop out of school. We refer to
this relationship as the impact of bombing on education at the extensive margin.
Second, individual’s additional years of schooling s, conditional on staying in school s > 0, is
a decreasing function of bombing destruction x. To see this, we differentiate the second case












Thus, the theory also suggests that an increase in the degree of bombing destruction generates
a reduction in individuals’ years of schooling, conditional on staying in school. We refer to
this relationship as the impact of bombing on education at the intensive margin.
Overall, the model shows that the aerial bombardment decreases educational attainment of
school-age individuals during the wartime. At the extensive margin, the devastation forces
them to drop out of school while at the intensive margin, shortens the additional years of
education for those not dropping out.
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